Rewinding the electoral clock: the reverberations of snap elections in Malta’s Westminster-modelled parliamentary system

by Gianni Farrugia 

Article 76(2) of the Constitution of Malta [1] reads: “….Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the date of its first sitting after any dissolution and shall then stand dissolved.” Professedly, this seems a very standard and fundamental article within the Constitution and indeed of any Westminster-style parliamentary system; a very democratic article of the highest law of our Republic which effectively prevents dictatorship and upholds governmental integrity. Sensibly, the term-span provision in a constitution is a staple of any democracy. However, there is a key three-word phrase that has the ability topractically negate its subsequent contents within the same article. The aforementioned keyphrase from this excerpt of the Constitution which shall indeed be the focus of the article is, predictably: “unless sooner dissolved”. 

A foundational tenet of a Westminster-derived parliamentary democracy is that the executive is drawn from and accountable to the legislature, which executive is headed by a member of the legislature (ordinarily termed the ‘Prime Minister’) who, to hold his position, must continually enjoy the confidence of a majority of members of the legislature. [2]

It is no secret that election timing in Westminster-model parliamentary systems is more often than not a strategic affair for the incumbent government. Article 76 of the Constitution accords constitutional power to dissolve Parliament and thereby trigger an early, or ‘snap’, election to the President of the Republic, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. This basally means that the Prime Minister can call an early general election at any (generally politically favourable) moment. An illustrious Maltese example of this is undoubtedly the 2017 general election. Prime Minister Joseph Muscat announced the dissolution of Parliament approximately one year before the parliamentary term was scheduled to expire secundum constitutionem. The 2017 general election has been characterised as a perfect example of the politically opportune snap election; a propitious ascendancy by virtue of being in executive administration of the nation, an upper-hand over the Opposition who, essentially, may one day unwittingly find themselves out of parliamentary employment and subsumed into a general election campaign. The Labour Party was indeed correct in their judgement to call an early general election as they retained a substantial gap in both popular/percentual vote and the parliamentary seat gap as they had previously done in the landslide victory in 2013. 

This ‘fortuity’ accorded to incumbent governments has indeed drawn certain counteraction in certain jurisdictions, notably in the United Kingdom, citing a lack of democratic fairness and a right to predictability and stability in a modern democratic society, through the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. Naturally, such an attempt to offset what many considered a rudimentary component of any Westminster-model parliamentary democracy was indeed met with criticism, and ultimately parliamentary abrogation. [3]

Indeed, the circumstances under which an early general election in Malta may occur vary, and such circumstances do not always warrant the advice to the President of the Prime Minister in order for Parliament to be dissolved (and thus subsequently trigger a general election). Art. 76(5a) accords the President with autonomous power to dissolve Parliament should the Prime Minister, upon losing the confidence of a majority of members of the House of Representatives, not resign or advise to dissolve Parliament within three days of losing the confidence of the House. 

A tangential but salient note in this respect is the answer (if there is a definite one) to the question of what constitutes a ‘loss of confidence’. This matter, especially in Malta has proved quite contentious, particularly in the rearmost parliamentary sittings of the Eighth Legislature, preceding the 1998 general election in Malta. This election, one which I naturally could not but mention in this article, is arguably one of the most noteworthy elections in post-Independence Malta. The 1998 general election took place on the 5th of September 1998, after Prime Minister Dr Alfred Sant, who had not even yet reached two full years in office as Prime Minister following his victory of the 1996 general election, saw his hold on power swing back to the Nationalist Party. For the purposes of this article, I will not go into the merits of the political mechanics that resulted in this governmental swing, but rather into the merits of the dissolution of Parliament and calling of the election itself. Basally, the cardinal bone of contention, that arguably remains contentious even today, is whether Prime Minister Sant dissolved Parliament of his own accord or was forced to do so upon ‘losing confidence’. Now, in spheres of general discussion, I have indeed found rebuttal of my treatment of this matter as unnecessary or unwarranted; a ‘cry over spilt milk’ maybe. 

Nonetheless, I personally find it important to determinately define what constitutes a loss of confidence in the Executive of the nation. I say this especially when considering a ruling of then-Speaker Myriam Spiteri Debono on this matter, in which Madam Speaker statedverbatim: “fis-Seduta Nru. 239 il-Kamra ma kellhiex quddiemha riżoluzzjoni ta' sfiduċja fil-Gvern, liema riżoluzzjoni trid tkun speċifika u jrid ikollha notice ta' tlett ijiem, kif inhunormali, imma kellha biss riżoluzzjoni fuq il-proġett tal-Kottonera.” [4] While reading the transcript of the parliamentary sitting in question, I saw what preceded this ruling by the Speaker was a heated debate between the Opposition and Government benches on the treatment of a resolution on the infamous Cottonera Waterfront project proposal by the House as a vote of confidence. 

Of course, no discord or friction would have arose had the abovementioned resolution passed, which it did not, as the Government led by Dr Alfred Sant found rebellion from the backbench, notably and solely (owing to the government’s one-seat majority) from former Prime Minister Dom Mintoff. Nevertheless, I assert, in agreement with then-Madam Speaker that, constitutionally speaking, the House did not have before it a vote of no confidence as prescribed in Art. 76(5a). What the government of the day decided to treat or regard as a vote of confidence ties, in my opinion, with the notion of prerogative, the same prerogative afforded to the Prime Minister in Art. 76(5) (read with Art. 76(1)), and which prerogative the Prime Minister did indeed use when he finally advised President Ugo Mifsud Bonnici to dissolve Parliament in August 1998. 

I find it pertinent to additionally note that while the abovementioned 1998 vote on the transfer of government land to a private consortium is indeed a deeply unorthodox example of a ‘vote of confidence’ in the Government, what is widely treated, quasi-religiously, as a vote of confidence is the annual vote for the House to resolve itself into a Committee of Supply in consideration of the following year’s financial estimates, or, rather and more simply, the ‘budget vote’. In October 2012, the Nationalist Party government headed by Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi lost this vote after backbench rebellion and thus recommended to President George Abela the dissolution of Parliament in January 2013 with elections scheduled for March of the same year. 

Recalibrating back to the circumstances in which Parliament may stand dissolved, the Constitution then prescribes for an event in which the office of Prime Minister stands vacant, and “there is no prospect of his being able within a reasonable time to appoint to thatoffice a person who can command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Representatives”. [5] There has never been a dissolution of Parliament in Malta on the grounds of Art. 76(5b). Unremarkably, whenever an intra-term vacancy has arisen within the office of the Prime Minister, in more recent modern times especially as political parties find themselves well-organised internally, such a vacancy has always been filled. Undoubtedly, if such a vacancy arises without any prospect of its filling in sight, a political stalemate [6] would ensue, with dissolution the self-evident medicine to such an ail. The most recent example in this respect is the intra-term resignation of Prime Minister Joseph Muscat (announced intention in December 2019, resigned in January 2020), whose shoes were filled by incumbent Prime Minister Robert Abela. Even in the case of the death of a Prime Minister, with the only example we have of this in the history of Malta’s self-governing politics being Enrico Mizzi (d. September 1950), who also happens to be Malta’s shortest-serving Prime Minister at just 85 days in office, the Nationalist Party was quick to find his replacement; George Borg Olivier, who then went on to become one of Malta’s most reputable Prime Ministers; the Prime Minister who secured Malta’s independence from the British. It is pertinent to note that this is yet another case in which the President wields constitutional authority to act alone, naturally as this article prospects a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister. 

The last of three constitutional provisos concerning the dissolution of Parliament is arguably quite impressionistic and idiosyncratic in wording. Perhaps nominally one of the strongest ex cathedra and pleno iure discretions afforded to the President of the Republic (who, as I hope this article manifests, is not simply a ceremonial figurehead or formality juggernaut, but a constitutional figure of certain magnitude). This proviso simply states that the President may refuse dissolution advised by the Prime Minister if he “considers that the Government of Malta can be  carried on without a dissolution and that a dissolution would not be in the interests of Malta”. The first question that pops into my mind upon reading this stipulation is: can the President refuse dissolution recommended for politically strategic motives? In accordance with constitutional conventions as outlined by authoritative writings, the probably overarching purpose of this article is to ensure the incumbent Prime Minister does not curb the formation of an alternative government, either through a new coalition agreement or by the selection of an individual (customarily a new leader of that party) who enjoys the support of a majority of members of the House, by recommending dissolution. [7] [8]

I must admit that, apart from my wonted interest in constitutional law and Maltese political history, a motivation for writing this article is indeed the swirling rumours of an early general election, [9] rumours that have been floating for quite a while now, especially with the (quite narrow) election of the new Leader of the Opposition, Alex Borg, who seems to be steadily gaining popular ground following his assumption of office. [10] As the last general election held in 2022 saw the Labour Party retaining around the same wide percentual gap in votes between itself at the Nationalist Party that it had achieved and enjoyed in three consecutive elections since 2013, the probability of retaining such a gap in the next general election is quite an unresolved topic of debate.

Veering away from fact and more onto opinion; what, in my mind, the incumbent government is postulating in terms of strategy could be any of the following: evaluating no real threat to its majority and thus genuinely intend to stay in office until the expiration of the parliamentary term (as the Prime Minister himself has said [11]), or snatch the opportunity to retain government, although with a reduced majority (if one were to base his conjectures on surveys published in the news and social media). Though, if the latter were the case, meaning if the Government was basing its decision on whether or not to call the early general election off of surveys published in the news and social media, many reckon that the election would occur, as was the case in 2017, approximately one year before schedule, that is, in this case, March 2026, with dissolution likely around January. 

There are, of course, multiple educated opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of such a decision, mainly of a political nature. These include yet more stricture of the Nationalist Party to Opposition in the event of a Labour victory, though embarrassment for the Labour Party if there is an upset in the polls, coupled with the apparent potential scent on the Government of attempting to grapple onto power for as long as possible in the early calling of the election itself. In any event, any political party’s mantra while campaigning in a general election would be for its election to “five years in Government”. Teleologically and prefiguratively, any newly elected government would always initially intend to serve its entire five years in office to which it was elected. Whether it does indeed intend do so is a separate issue governed by a number of factors. Generally speaking, however, notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances discussed in this article, it is the government’s reputation and popularity at the time that habitually governs such a decision. Sometimes it would be wise for a Prime Minister to cut his current term early to ensure a subsequent term, other times a Prime Minister might find his back against the wall in terms of popularity and deems it judicious to simply enjoy what time in office he has left, among other situations, depending on the circumstances. In omnibus rebus, while every government is elected to serve a five-year term, whether it completes that term falls within a distinct sphere of considerations. 

Gianni Farrugia is a second-year law student and the incumbent Director for Seminars and Conferences of ELSA Malta.

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[1] Constitution of Malta, Chapter VI: The Parliament, Part III: Summoning, prorogation and dissolution

[2] Government synopsis, www.gov.mt (n.d.) accessed 16 October 2025.

[3] Catherine Haddon, ‘Election 2017: Putting the Fixed-term Parliaments Act into practice’ (Institute for Government, 21 April 2017) https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/comment/election-2017-putting-fixed-term-parliaments-act-practice? accessed 17 October 2025.

[4] Ruling of Speaker Myriam Spiteri Debono, Sitting 240, 8th Legislature (13 July 1998)

[5] Article 76(5b), Constitution of Malta.

[6] T. Borg, A Commentary on the Constitution of Malta (2nd ed., 2022) p. 456

[7] ibid p. 457

[8] S.A. De Smith, R. Brazier. Constitutional and Administrative Law (1968) p. 118

[9] Albert Galea, ‘Will he? Won’t he? The pros and cons of an early election’ (The Malta Independent, 29 June 2025) https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2025-06-29/local-news/Will-he-Won-t-he-The-pros-and-cons-of-an-early-election-6736271249 accessed 17 October 2025.

[10] Bertrand Borg, ‘Labour leads PN by 5% as gap narrows: Times of Malta poll’ (Times of Malta, 12 October 2025) <https://timesofmalta.com/article/labour-leads-pn-5-gap-narrows-times-malta-poll.1117697> accessed 17 October 2025.

[11] Emma Borg, ‘Watch: Robert Abela rules out early general election’ (Times of Malta, 13 January 2025) https://timesofmalta.com/article/watch-robert-abela-rules-early-general-election.1103648 accessed 17 October 2025.